IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1119

International Court of Justice

Filed Nov. 23, 1945
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al

defendants

DOCUMENT BOOK

"L"

In re: Aggressive War - Opening Statement

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U. S. Chief of Counsel

To be argued by: SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN

Of Counsel:

SIDNEY J. KAPLAN
Commander, USCGR

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Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours, Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference it to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While re-organizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conferenc It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few be-lievers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the

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greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and materiel. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America

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is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me, I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. Now construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies

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in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat. Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not

ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unashamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 789-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2261-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C O P Y !

The Reichs Minister of War
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
No. 1820/35 Top Secret L. II a

Berlin, 24 June 1935

TOP SECRET

To

The Supreme Commander of the Army
The Supreme Commander of the Navy
The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces

In the appendix I transmit one copy each if the law for the defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935 and of a decision of the Reichs Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich's defense council. The publication of the Reich's defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the Führer and Reichchancellor.

The Führer and Reichschancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht to be "plenipotentiary-general for war economy".

I request that the copies of the Reich's defense law needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war.

I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.

(Signed) von Blomberg.

No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a

Berlin, 3 Sept 1935

To

Defense-Economic Group G-3
copy
transmitted

(signed) Jodl

H1119-0009

COPY!

Reichs' Defense Law
of 21 May 1935

The Reichs Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made public:

Part I State of Defense

ARTICLE 1.

The Führer and Reichschancellor can declare a state of defense for the area of the Reich in case danger of war threatens.

ARTICLE 2.

(1) With the declaration of a state of defense the entire power of execution devolves upon the Führer and Reichschancellor. The Reichsminister of war exercizes it by his orders.

(2) The Reichsminister is empowered in the carrying out of the power of execution to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws. He can, in order to enforce his regulation, threaten punishments and set up special courts.

ARTICLE 3.

(1) The Reichsministers care to observe the instructions of the Reichsminister of war. They remain the highest Reich authorities within their realm of activity.

(2) The Reichsminister will in case of a state of defense effect the necessary measures and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.

Part II Mobilization

ARTICLE 4.

(1) If conflict with an external enemy becomes unavoidable, the Führer and Reichschancellor can order mobilization.

(2) The ordering of mobilization includes in itself the declaration of a state of defense according to Part I, in case the latter is not already proclaimed, without prejudice to the directive of Article Six.

(3) With the ordering of mobilization a state of war in the definition of this law begins.

ARTICLE 5.

The Reichsministers will effect the necessary measures in case of mobilization and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.

ARTICLE 6.

(1) The Führer and Reichschancellor will appoint a plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war economy.

(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war-economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German people economically.

(3) Subordinate to him are:

The Reichsminister for economy
The Reichsminister for food and agriculture
The Reichs labor minister
The Reichs forest master and all Reichs' agencies immediately subordinate to the Führer and Reichschancellor.

Furthermore the financing of the war effort, (in the province of the Reichs finance ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under his responsibility.

(4) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy is authorized, within his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations, which may deviate from the existing laws.

Part III Setting of penalties and Conclusion

ARTICLE 7

Whoever purposely or carelessly acts in violation of a decree issued by authority of this law will be, insofar as a severer punishment is not stipulated according to other directives, punished with jail and with fine or with one of these penalties.

ARTICLE 8.

The Führer and Reichschancellor will issue the necessary legal and administrative directives for carrying out of this law.

Berlin, 21 May 1935

The Führer and Reichschancellor
(signed) ADOLF HITLER
The Reichsminister of war
(signed) VON BLOMBERG
The Reichsminister of the Interior
(signed) FRICK

Note
on the law for the defense of the Reich
of 21 May 1935

The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935.

The Führer and Reichschancellor

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

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Copy.

Copy.

Decision of the Reichscabinettof 2I May I935
on the Council for the defense of the Reich.

Supplementing the decision of the Reichscabinet of 4 April I933 and I3 Dec 34 on formation of a council for defense of the Reich, the Reichscabinet has made the following decision:

I.) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy appointed by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime. At the suggestion of the chairman of the Council for the defense of the Reich, he will direct the economic preparations for war, insofar as they do not, in reference to the armament industry fall into the province of the Reichs' Ministry of war. In case of mobilization the following are subordinated to him:

Reichsministry of economic affairs
Reichsministry of for food and agriculture
Reichsministry of Labor
Reich's forest-master and all Reichsoffices immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer.

In case of mobilization he will direct and be responsible for the financing of the war effort (in the province of the financeministry and the Reichsbank).

These ministries and the Reich's authorities are bound already in time of peace to observe his recommodations for the preparation of a war economy and the fiancing of the war-effort.

2.) The Reichsminister of War and the plenipotentiary for war economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on both sides.

3.) The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy will be a permanent member of the Reich Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat). Within the working committee he represents through his leadership staff the interests of war economy. The department heads (Referenten) for the defense of the Reich of the Ministries mentioned in Point I are bound by the recommodations of this leadership staff.

Foundation:

The State of War, an institution of the old law, as it was established in the old Reichsconstitution of I87I, the Prussian law on the state of siege of 4 June I86I and the Bavarian law on the state of war of 5 Nov I9I2, has been only incompletely replaced in Article 48 of the Reichsconstitution of II August I9I9. Moreover, the provisions of Article 48 no longer correspond to the actual legal conditions.

The new law for the defense of the Reich should create clear legal bases for the transfer of the whole machinery of state from a state of peace to one of war. In this connection it was to be noted that a state of war can begin unexpectedly or from a state of foreign political tension. Since the time of such tension must be utilized as far as foreign political relations will bear, it in order to create a readiness for war in time, the law for the defense of the Reich provides two steps for the transfer from state of peace to state or war:

I. The state of defense
2. The mobilization

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For both steps of war preparation, the law gives the legal basis, upon which the individual measures of the Reichsdepartments can be built up as the council for the defense of the Reich instructs.

It is to be mentioned in regard to the provisions of the law in detail:

To Article 2

The exercize of the power of execution by the Reichsminister of war under the Führer and Reichschancellor should emphasize the pressing necessity of all demands of the immediate conduct of the war and should guarantee their fulfillment.

To Article 4, Section 3

In numerous laws special provisions for war are contained. It is therefore necessary, to establish the beginning of a state of war, in respect to times in order to create clear conditions for the administration of justice etc. Since, however, in a future war official declarations of war are not to be expected, as a result of which Article 42 Section 2 of the Reichsconstitution also is obsolete, the beginning of a state of war is to be considered as being at the same time as the beginning of the mobilization.

To Article 6

The experiences of the great war have demonstrated the necessity of including during a war the entire economy and the financing of the conduct of the war under unified leadership. The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy should according to the will of the Führer and Reichschancellor take over the responsible leadership and stands thereby independently along side the Reichsminister of war, the possessor of the power of execution, and responsible for his realm of activity under the Führer and Reichschancellor.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2261-PS

24 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 2261-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.386-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet, in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space then that is the result of historical development spread over several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for

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living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is NOT possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditures of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increase consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalisation is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonisation; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement,

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and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those States who base their existence on exports. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in EUROPE, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in EUROPE directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this prupose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in EUROPE.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND has suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favours would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by poor politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:

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a) IRELAND's struggle for independence

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilise the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to ITALY which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an inceasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for BRITAIN while ITALY is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILESIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45 After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then , dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943/45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943/45. The necessity for action before 1943/45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2 Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, thenthe time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3 It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against GERMANY.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943/45, then the behaviour of FRANCE, ENGLAND, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without ENGLAND's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by FRANCE through BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with FRANCE, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of GREAT BRITAIN. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that CZECHOSLOVAKIA's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and thata consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of CZECHOSLOVAKIA in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from CZECHOSLOVAKIA and of 1 million from AUSTRIA could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to GERMANY militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to theremoval of CZECHOSLOVAKIA is expected on the part of ITALY; however, it cannot be judge today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the DUCE were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed our our action would decide POLAND's attitude. POLAND will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious GERMANY, with RUSSIA in the rear.

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Case 2 Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, thenthe time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

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H1119-0018

H1119-0019

Military participation by RUSSIA must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need to taken into consideration at all in view of JAPAN'S attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of FRANCE by a Civil war - then the situation shoud be utilized at any time for operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA, as GERMANY's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in SPAIN, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by FRANCE, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by FRANCE is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN. Should FRANCO be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of ITALY on the BALEARIC ISLES. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in SPAIN, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen ITALY in her fight to hold on to the BALEARIC ISLES. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the BALEARIC ISLES can NOT be tolerated either by FRANCE or by ENGLAND and could lead to a war by FRANCE and ENGLAND against ITALY, in which case SPAIN, if entirely in white (i.e. FRANCO's) hands, could participate on the side of ITALY's enemies. A subjugation of ITALY in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to ITALY via GERMANY. The Fuehrer believes that ITALY's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against FRANCE on the Western frontier and carry out operations against FRANCE from LIBYA against the North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of Franch-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the ALPS to Upper ITALY would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to FRANCE, so that at its frontiers with ITALY and GERMANY, FRANCE will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If GERMANY profits from this war by disposing of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN and the AUSTRIAN questions, the probability must be assumed that ENGLAND - being at war with ITALY - would not decide to commence operations against GERMANY. Without British support a warlike action by FRANCE against GERMANY is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent on the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, by in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightening (blitzartig schnell)".

Fieldmarshall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that ENGLAND and FRANCE must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with ITALY would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to Commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von FRITSCH estimated the French forces which would presumable be employed on the ALPINE frontier against ITALY to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the RHINELAND. We should consider the lead which FRANCE has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG - the

four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Fieldmarschall von BLOMBERG drew special attention to the strength of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a MAGINOT line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von FRITSCH mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermended by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH regarding ENGLAND and FRANCE's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of BRITAIN'S non-participation and the consequently he did not believe in military action by FRANCE against GERMANY. Should the MEDITERRANEAN conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in EUROPE, then we should have to commence operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then GERMANY would , for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst GOERING considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in SPAIN. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(in ink)
Certified: (Signed) HOSZBACH

Kirchbach
Oberst. d. A. (Col. General Staff)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386 PS

14 November 1945

I, E. GLAZIER, P/O, 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the avove is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386 PS.

E. GLAZIER
P/O, 37371

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PS
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H1119-0020A

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

(pencil note)

S.O. Only

"FALL GRÜN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

H1119-0021

ITEM 1

- - - ? of the Fuehrer: (semi-illegible)

1). Does MUSSOLINI regard his work as completed or not.

a). if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia West then wait and see. "Return with the bag empty."

b). if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2). MUSSOLINI, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with that.

3). Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4). Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5). State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:

a). Deliveries of ores: France -- 600,000 tons
Germany - 2 million tons.

b). Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launching not for 2 years.

c). Out of date air force equipment.

6). No general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.

7). Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8). Replacement of officers doubtful.

* * *

Schm

(M. Schmundt's writing and initialled by him)

H1119-0022

ITEM 2

S.O. Only

Berlin, 22 April 1938

BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General KEITEL of 21 April:

A. Political Aspect

1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. Military Conclusions

1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2) and 3). Case 2). is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3). "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force is to support the individual columns. (e.g. divebombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4). Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army.(e.g. via Pi past Pr) (Pilsen, Prague).

5). If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.

H1119-0023

C. Propaganda

1). Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).

2). Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm

(initialled by Schmundt)

Written by an officer

H1119-0024

ITEM 2

22 April

A). POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1). Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2). Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3). Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B). MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1). Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in a direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe, cooperation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.)

2). "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstance. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via PILSEN. Hamper mobilization.

3). Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a). in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b). but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle : Create Accomplished Facts so that

a). help comes too late - other powers do not intervene

b). Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)

c). State collapses from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans
Threats to others

Submit: 1). Fortifications (strength in detail)

2). Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.

H1119-0025

ITEM 3

MOS 1 16/5 0925 -
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

ZEITZLER

Most Secret - 1) Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization?

2) What is the final day of mobilization?

SCHMUNDT

MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting)

- - - - - - - - -

MOS No. 2 1115 -

MBZ 02 16/5 1114 -

Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to Question 1

12 of them - in garrisons

to Question 2

Third day - Please state time of receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110 - NN

ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

- - - - - - - - -

MOS 03 16/5 1155

OKW for Oberst leutnant Zeitzler - Most Secret

1). Teleprint received 1115

2). Please send the numbers of the divisions.

Schmundt

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting) 1159 MOS 03 Wagner?

- - - - - - - - -

MBZ 04 16/5 1302 -

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8, armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.

H1119-0026

ITEM 4

MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER - MOST SECRET
IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL
STAFF

H1119-0027

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont.)

ITEM 5

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 20 May 1938
Tirpitzufer 72.76

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L Ia No. 38/38 S.O. Only

S.O. Only
access only through Officer

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer

(signed) Keitel

H1119-0028

ITEM 5 written by an officer

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only Berlin, 20 May 1938

MOST SECRET
S. O. Only
access only through officer

DRAFT

for

3 Copies
1st Copy

(Provisional) - pencil note

THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"

1). Political Prerequisites:

It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2). Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:

An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a). after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b). by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

b). is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3). Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen"; which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a). and 2 b)..

a) For Armed War it is essential to create-- already in the first 4 days - a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b). The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand,

H1119-0029

H1119-0030

give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c). The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed War. I myself will determine the date.

Z (initialled at end by Zeitzler)

For paragraphs 4)., 5)., and 6). see under ITEM 11

H1119-0031

ITEM 6

Questions on "Gruen"

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

3). Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

6). What calibres andhow large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications suchas fortresses?

ITEM 6

L Ia

Berlin, 23 May
MOST SECRET

Questionnaire of 23 May

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peacetime division : 14,000 men
Strength of a division made ready to march: 14,000 men
(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division : 17,000 men

3). Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization.

In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle Battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns. 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) for independent thrust.

In the case of mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably from 1 October).

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.

6). What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?

Only 21 cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia)

H1119-0032

H1119-0033

with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).

(In Schmundt writing): In general, single experimental artillery piece (guns).

Z (initialled by Zeitzler)

- - - - - - - - -

On next page the questions are put again plus, the following additional questions):

7). What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier fortifications look like? Profile?

8). Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks against enemy strongpoints etc.?

9). Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of work columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?

10). What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) programme? What progress has been made in the coversion of heavy naval guns?

* * *

(Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. I request that you report the answers to the Fuehrer."

ITEM 8

1). INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2). INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A). THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1), HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANOEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B). THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST

(NOTE FOR K KPT V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1). AND 2). AFTER USE)

H1119-0034

ITEM 9

REICH WAR MINISTRY/ NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE

MOST SECRET

CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES. THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C'S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

H1119-0035

H1119-0036

ITEM 10

ILLEGIBLE

H1119-0037

ITEM 11

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L I

Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy

S.O. Only

3 Copies
1st Copy

Access only through Officer

Written by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directives must be expected during the next few weeks.

by order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

1 Appendix

sgd. Keitel

To:	C-in-C Army	Copy 1
	C-in-C Navy	Copy 2
	C-in-C Air Force	Copy 3
OKW Section L		Copy 4 - 5

Certified a true copy

Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

H1119-0038

ITEM 11

MOST SECRET

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S. O. Only L Ia
dated 30.5.38.

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Written by an Officer

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Access only through Officer

II. Two front war with main effort in the South East (strategic concentration "Gruen")

1). Political Prerequisites.

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorabe opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2). Political Possibilites for the Commencement of the Action.

The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a). suitable obvious cause and, with it
b). sufficient political justification,
c). action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceeding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part - which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent - before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

3). Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a). For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland

ITEM 11

and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b). The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4). Tasks of the Armed Forces.

Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a). The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b). For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c). The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.

5). Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces

a). Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or

(* - * passages between asterisks occur only in this version not in Item 5)

H1119-0039

H1119-0040

ITEM 11 (cont.)

airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of *frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen". *Independent of this, a first security garison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia, are to be weakly protected. But, alway depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

b). Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see 5a) The most important task of the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army and agains the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the direction of the government and Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial successes of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout BERLIN, the central German industrial area and the RUHR, area,* and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c). Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the DANUBE-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

H1119-0041

ITEM 11 (cont.)

is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, be avoided.

6). Tasks of the War Economy:

In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made possible through increased supples. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war- economic strength - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works instalations - insofar as military operations permit - can be of decisive importance to us.

7). *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.*

signed ADOLF HITLER

Certified copy

signed Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

H1119-0042

ITEM 12

L I a H

Berlin, 9 June 1938.

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY

1. SMALL ARMS

Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle.

2. MACHINE GUNS

Light MG Z.B. 26, wieht 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

3. MORTARS

8.1cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

4. INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns. Calibre 37 - 40 mm and/or 66 - 70 mm.

5. ARTILLERY PIECES

a. Light and Mountain Artillery:

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km

8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.

7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

b. Heavy Artillery:

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.

H1119-0043

ITEM 12

15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.

15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.

24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.

21cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.

30.5cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 16, range 12,4 km.

Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c. A A Artillery

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.

8.35 cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.

7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.

6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

FUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938

H1119-0044

H1119-0045

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(Cont'd)

ITEM 13

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies

1st copy

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

Answer:

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament industry.

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized.

In Detail:

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from the Austrian Army predominates.

Mountain Artillery: the same.

Medium artillery. New armament predominates.

Heavy artillery, old armament predominates.

Infantry Weapons: The following are available:

a uniform new infantry rifle; a uniform new light MG;

a uniform old improved heavy MG.

Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.

SUMMARY: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as armament and equipment are concerned.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1119-0046

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 2: How many battalions, etc. are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

Answer:

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:

The 36th Infantry Battalion

The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company

The 12th Anti-Tank Company

The 10th Battery

The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions

In addition:

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion , and later the 190th German Labour Corps battalion.

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

(Pencilled notes by Schmundt):

Number of troops

Production possibilities

H1119-0047

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czecho Slovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

Answer:

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?

Answer:

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is undertaken by the VGAD, then the Frontier Guard. This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons (reserve personnel).

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:

15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1119-0048

ITEM 14

L I a

Berlin, 18 June 1938

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

1. DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE

(1st copy)

In three parts.

H1119-0049

H1119-0050

ITEM 14 MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

Written by an officer.

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

Part 1

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:

a) thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b) Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c) Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See part 3.

d) Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

H1119-0051

ITEM 14

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offered without any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the overeagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K (Initialled by Keitel)

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

H1119-0052

ITEM 14

Written by an officer MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

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Part 2

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1. Action against Czecho-Slovakia ("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S. O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special matters, Administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West ("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for the Navy in "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

J
K (Initialled by Keitel and Jodl)

H1119-0053

ITEM 14

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

MOST SECRET Berlin, 7 July 38

2 copies
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S. O. only

access only through officer

Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" - contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a)

If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.

H1119-0054

To b) If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this Mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.

II. Independent of "Fall Gruen"

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L Ia).

III. General

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.

Z

K (Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler)

H1119-0055

ITEM 16

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1233/38 Most Secret L Ia

Berlin, 22 July 1938

MOST SECRET

2 Copies
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To:

Major Schmundt or deputy

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested.(e.g. the remark of Chief OKW).

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

by order

signed Zeitzler

Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.

Schm (pencil note by Schmundt)

Stamp:
Adjutants' Office of the
Armed Forces to the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor
Recd. 26? July 1938 App. 1
No. 82/38 Most Secret

H1119-0056

ITEM 16 pencil note: Maj. Schmundt
1 copy 3rd
report to
Fuehrer

L Ia
to L No. 1233/38 Most Secret

Berlin, 12 July 1938

2 Copies
1st Copy

Conference Notes

K (initialled by Keitel)

MOST SECRET

OKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for alteration: development of the Western fortifications and spreading of the foot-and-mouth-disease.

Details:

1). Of the previously intended training manoeuvres, the following remain:

Fall exercise for the I Army Corps
Training exercise for the XI Army Corps
Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

2). New training manoeuvres:

a). Fighting for fortifications

b). Coordination with the Air Force

c). Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area

d). Mobilization exercises for the Staffs

e). Supply and communications control

f). Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

3). Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions:

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there

2nd Armored Division remains in Austria

3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGSBRUECK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

4). Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march:

2nd motorized Division in exercise area A, from 28 September, in NEUHAMMER

29th motorized Division in exercise area B

20th motorized Division in exercise area C

13th motorized Division in exercise area D

1st light Division in exercise area E

H1119-0057

ITEM 16 (cont'd)

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24 November.

5). Terrain exercises for units ready to march:

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,

commencement of Terrain exercises: 20 September

6). Training manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on mobilization:

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR - PICHL - WEGER
3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING - BRUCK
commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

7). Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions):

a). 15 August to 13 September:
Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units
Exercise Area NEUHAMMER,
Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area GROSSBORN,
Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units
Exercise Area JUETERBOG.

b). 9 September to 24 November:
Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units
Exercise Area OHRDRUF
Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area SENNE
Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units
Exercise Area MUENDINGEN
Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units
Exercise Area WAHN
From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

8). New dispositions:

a). Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III Army Corps.

b). Army Artillery:

6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training
11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.

Of these, beginning 24 September:

5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE
6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"

c). Engineer Battalions:

3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.

H1119-0058

ITEM 16 (cont'd)

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops "ready to march"
1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.

d). Artillery Intelligence Regiments:

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized)
9 September to 24 November.

Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR , NEWHAMMER, INGOLSTADT.

9). Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications:

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3 weeks, also 7 Engineer battalions will be added.

10). Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival:

Participation remains as intended.

11). Foreign Military Delegations:

The foreign Military Delegations as well as foreign military attaches will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.

Z (initialled by ZEITZLER)

H1119-0059

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 17

Chief Section L — Written by General Staff Officer

MOST SECRET

S.O. Only — Berlin, 24 August 1938

access only through Officer

1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW [illegible] demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provcation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

H1119-0060

ITEM 17 (cont'd)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 26/8

Notes:

Submitted on 30.8

The Fuehrer will act on these lines.

On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8 Col. Jodl

(initialled by Jodl)

H1119-0061

ITEM 18

CONFERENCE

on 3 September 38
at the BERGHOF

Present: The Fuhrer
Generaloberet v. Brauchitsch
General of Artillery Keitel
Major Schmundt

I.

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch — Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

Fuhrer — Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camoflage exercises everywhere.

? — OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.

II.

The Fuhrer — Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hinderance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of PRAGUE. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of BOHEMIA will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of VERDUN in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.

v. Brauchitsch — Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and untrained leaders.

H1119-0062

ITEM 18

The Fuhrer: The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations. Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. The Fuhrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications: improvement of advance positions around AACHEN and SAARBRUCKEN. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

Certified.

SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff

BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938

* * *

(In Schmundt's writing)

H1119-0063

ITEM 19

S. O. Only

MOST SECRET

DISCUSSION

Nuremberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.

Present: Fuhrer
General oberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below (?)

General Halder states reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia - Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of OLUMUTZ and BRUUN to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz forces. Several defensive lines favorable by terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps. Olumutz will be reached on the second day. OPPA is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. FREUDENTAL only 35 men garrison? So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist party of Mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the GLAZ mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9 ?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armies will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10th Army faces PILSEN RIEGEL which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridgeheads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.

H1119-0064

ITEM 19

The Fuhrer: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two factors are decisive:
1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between TRAPPAU and NIKOLSBURG. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the DANUBE to protect the Southern flank.
2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there - otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive, within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (210cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid, sets in (VERDUN!!) Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")
Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large, free space the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward BRUNN will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division. Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day. The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.) Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the REICHENAU Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be created.
If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward PRAGUE may become necessary.

General Oberst v. BRAUCHITSCH: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.

H1119-0065

ITEM 19.

The Fuhrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuhrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

BRAUCHITSCH: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt(late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified

/s/ SCHMUNDT

Major on Gen. Staff

H1119-0066

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 20

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Nuremberg, 10 September 1938

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

TOP SECRET

1). The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2). The Chief of OKW decides on the First commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competeney he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3). For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

T 9.9

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reichsminister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danchwerts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Adwin Office (VOA)

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H1119-0067

ITEM 21

Berlin, 14 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
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Stamp
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938
Reg. No. 198/38
Despatched Schm
Clerk (initialled by Schmidt)

SUBJECT: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht.

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1). The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.

2). Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Formanas, 2 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis. HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.

3). a). The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8),

b). Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the Country's Kultur etc. will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls (AMT) is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c). It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named in a), and b), above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

4). The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct.

II). 5). Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6). The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.

H1119-0068

ITEM 21 (cont'd)

7). In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.

III). 8). Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe, in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed Keitel

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H1119-0069

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 22

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 16 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia — 7 Copies
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S.O. Only

Access only through Officer — 19.9.38
Schm

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the LIMES-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed Keitel

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Major Schmundt

5

H1119-0070

ITEM 24

Berlin, September 16, 1939

MOST SECRET 30 Copies T 9.9
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No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/ L IIc

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Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938,
Enclosures
Reg. No. 199138
Despatched
Clerk

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)

1). The following RAD forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

From the area of the IInd Army Korps (AKs)	7 Battalions
IIIrd	2 Battalions
IVth	31 Battalions
Vth	1 Battalion
VIth	78 Battalions
VIIth	1 Battalion
IXth	65 Battalions
Xth	84 Battalions
XIth	33 Battalions

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2). The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Jodl

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H1119-0071

ITEM 25

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES.
THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(Pencil Note) 1045, 18 Sept 38
radioed to Capt.
Engel, Berlin.

H1119-0072

ITEM 26

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

(In ink)
18.9
38
1030
vb

GERMAN 2nd ARMY - COSEL - 7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

8th Army: - FREIBURG - 4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X-Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps - Herrenhut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

10th Army:- SCHWANDORF - 3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div,
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

12th Army:- PASSAU - 7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X-Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div,
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

14th Army: - VIENNA - 1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot (?) They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

END

Reich War Ministry / Naval Communication Service

MOST SECRET 18.9

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins -
(There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.)

Any questions?

ITEM 27

Army Appointments Held

Army Group Command:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Adam CofS : Gen. of Inf Wietersheim G-3 : Lt. Co. Muller
1st Army HQ:	C-in-C: Ge. of Arty Beck CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg
2nd Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt CofS : BrigGen v. Salmuth G-3 : Lt.Col.Hasse
3rd Army HQ:	C-in-C: Ge.Arty v. Kuechler CofS : Brig.Gen.Hollidt G-3 : Lt.Col.Wagner
4th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties) v. Hamerstein CofS : Maj.Gen. Viebahn G-3 : Lieut.Col. Metz
5th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern G-3 : Col. Duvert
7th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf (for special duties) Baron Zcutter v. Lotzen CofS : Brig. Gen. Modl G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben
8th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. v. Bock CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber G-3 : Col. Hauffe
10th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard G-3 : Col. Dostler
12th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special duties) v. Leeb CofS : Maj Gen. v. Lewinsky, known as v. Manstein G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt
14th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf List CofS : Maj Gen. Ruoff G-3 : Col. Wohler

H1119-0074

ITEM 29

Chief, OKW — Berlin, 21 Sept 1938

If the Czech Government accepts terms:

a. Cession of Sudeten German territory

b. Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,

The following military measures are to be considered:

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
   a. German Police (originally)
   b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.

ITEM 29

13. a. Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.

    b. Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5).

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.

17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock , undamaged.

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.)

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.

H1119-0076

ITEM 39

Bayreuth 134

Pencil Note: Written by Schmundt: Not sent off. Sehm

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS

Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal, (probably the first instance in the History of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.

Since 19 Sept. - in more than 300 missions - the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack (defense)* and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious loses in dead and wounded suffered by the enemy (The Czech Terrorists)*.

Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany.

For Konrad Henlein

The Chief of Staff

*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the original manuscript.

H1119-0077

Adj to the Fuhrer

(Note in pencil)

28/7
Schm.

Item 31

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin 27.9.1938

MOST SECRET — 1920 hours.

WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II — 45 copies
16th copy

The Fuhrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the TODT organization.

It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.

CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Signed. Keitel

Distribution: II.

C 000473

H1119-0078

Stamp:
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached
To the Führer and
Reich Chancellor
Recd. 3 Oct 1938
Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
cont.

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Item 32

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

Berlin 27 Sept 1938

Subject: Mobilization Measures:

Most Secret

To : The Deputy Führer via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of German Police Express
attn: S.S. Oberführer. 47 copies
18th copy

As a result of the political situation the Führer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organisations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:

1) The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.

2) Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School KREISCHWITZ - SILESIA).

3) Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organisations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL

Further:
Distribution II

28.9.38

Item 33 MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

At 1300 September 27 the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against "Grün" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.

This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt. (pencil note by Schmundt)

H1119-0079

H1119-0080

TRANSLATION OF DOC.NO. 388-PS
Continued

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant initialed Schm.
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938

Req. No.: 261/38 Most Secret

Item 34

Adj. to the Führer

Berlin, 28 Sept 38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a

45 copies
16th copy.

MOST SECRET

To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely onto the army, that is onto the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should -- in their own interests -- get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.

The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution II
plus:
Reich Minister of the Interior
Reich Finance Minister
Deputy of the Fuhrer
S.A. Hqs.
Reichsfuhrer SS
Reich Labour Service

Volunteer Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Köchling)

(The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33

H1119-0081

H1119-0082

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938 (pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer)

Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret

Item 35 Berlin, Sept 28, 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

MOST SECRET.

Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special Appendix 5

Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)

1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148 -- preparation of organization for the reception of refugees.

2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145 -- Preparation of employment of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for the discharging of reservists.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution II

H1119-0083

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Req. No: 260/38 Secret Schm.

Item 36

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, Sept 28, 1938
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

45 copies
16th copy

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Batallions subordinate to the C in C Army.

To : Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. MOST SECRET
(SS Central Office) (36 copies)

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia)

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office)

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Jodl

Further:

Distribution II

H1119-0084

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388-PS
Continued

L II b

Item 37

28.9.38.

MEMORANDUM

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:

Reichsfuhrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsfuhrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.

J. (initialled by Jodl)

H1119-0085

ITEM 38

Stamp - as usual
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET

Adjutant to the Fuhrer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a

Berlin 30.9.38
1600 hrs

120 Copies
16th copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuhrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuhrer SS.

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.

2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz. Krone:

The following rate of exchange will apply for all transactions and payments: 100 Cz. Kronen - 10.00 Marks (1 Cz. Krone - 10 Rpfg)

THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES

Distribution III
and Special Distribution
(including Henlein Volunteer
Corps and Reichsfuhrer SS
through OKW/L II)

Keitel

H1119-0086

ITEM 39

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 265/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The fuhrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces

OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret
WFA/L I A

Most Secret
60 copies
16th copy

DIRECTIVE #1

Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.

1. The sectors separated from Cz will be occupied by the Armed Forces as follows:

The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to Oct 10.

The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.

2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West, Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.

The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation "Grun".

The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international committee.

a. Army: First of all the following units are available for the invasion:
Training Bn's.
Motorized and Armoured Units
Adolf Hitler SS Bodyguard Regiment
I and II Bn's of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayen)
Henlein Free Corps
All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.

b. Air Force:
Those ground installations (including supply and signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the air defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Grun" in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under the command of the Army.

H1119-0087

ITEM 39

3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harrassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

KEITEL

Distribution: III

H1119-0088

ITEM 40

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 264/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a

Most Secret

Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1

Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.

1. Operational Area of the Army:

The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C's of the armies.

The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over regulations issued by other Superior authorities.

2. Units under Command of Army:

a. The units of the military SS and SS Totenkopf Regiment intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.

b. The Sudeten German Volunteer Corps comes under the control of OKH. The Bn's of the Volunteer Corps are to be employed in the direction of their native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through the army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to Eger.

c. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with Reichsfuhrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as much as possible.

3. Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations:

a. All military installations, barracks and property will be turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories by OKH in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. By OKL if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)

b. The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the Reich RR's regarding the taking over of rail installations.

4. Signal Communications:

a. The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the situation, the most important communication installations are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.

H1119-0089

ITEM 40

Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.

5. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal.

The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to #16 of the regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.

H1119-0090

6. Application of Laws:

a. Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German currency)

b. Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.

7. Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population:

Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by armed force authorities.

The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee the tasks of the armed forces.

a. Reichs Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas BRESLAU, DRESDEN, WÜRZBURG, NURNBERG, MUNCHEN, VIENNA, BERLIN. Establishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No, 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.

b. Ministry of Propoganda:

Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 and 1600)

8. Organisations of the Party:

The Fuhrer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organisations that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into the Sudeten area.

9. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Suppling of the armed forces with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and payments: 100 cz. krones=9,00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg) (the underlined crossed out!)

(pencil note: will be published this afternoon)

10. Payment of the armed forces

For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury)

11. Administrative Directives:

The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)

H1119-0091

12. Supply Installations:

For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin.Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s

Army H.Q.	Tech Hq	To	App	Time of Arrival
12	13	LANDAU/ISAR	10.1	2000
10	4	PLAUEN	10.2	2000
8	3	GORLITZ	10.1	2000
2	8	LAMSDORF(SW/OPPELN)	10.5	2000

13. Propaganda Companies:

Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

KEITEL

DISTRIBUTION: III
and Special Distribution

H1119-0092

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuhrer

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938

Req.No: 266/38 Most Secret

Item 41

Berlin 30.9.38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.

200 copies
153rd copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY

1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (OR case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the timebeing, remain at their present posts.

2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.

The Commander in Chief can, exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.

3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:

H1119-0093

Item 41

a. Reich Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nuernberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.

Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).

Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.

b. Propaganda Ministry:

Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)

c. Reichsbank:

Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part XVIII, Nr 8031)

4. Application of Laws:

a. There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the German Criminal Code into the occupied territory.

b. The Army Compensation Law (Wehrleistungsgestz) will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency)

5. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions (Kredit Instituten) is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:

100 Czech kronen - 10.00 RM (1 Czech krone -- 10 Pfg)

H1119-0094

Item 41

6. Payment of the Armed Forces:

For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.

7. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.

The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.

Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.

8. Administrative Directives:

The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Distribution: Overleaf

ITEM 41

DISTRIBUTION

The Fuhrer's deputy for the attention of SS-Oberfuhrer Knoblauch	1st copy
Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for the attention of Reichminister Dr. Lammers	2nd copy
Foreign Office for the attention of Leg. Rat. Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch	3rd copy
Reichminister of the Interior for the attention of Min. Div. Dr. Danckwerts	4th copy
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police - Reich Defence (RV) Section - for the attention of SS-Brigadefuehrer Petri	5th copy
Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda for the attention of Major (Reserve) Wentscher	6th copy
Reich Minister of Justice for the attention of Min. Rat Haastert	7th copy
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Reich Minister of Transport - Railroad Dept. - for the attention of Div. Dr. Ebeling	11th copy
Reich Minister for Science, Education - National Culture for the attention of Min. Div. Prof. Dr. Krummel	12th copy
Reich Postal Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Honold	13th copy
General Inspector for German Roadways for the attention of Reg. Baurat Schäffler	14th copy
Minister President General Fieldmarshall Göring Director of the Four Year Plan and the Prussian State Ministry for the attention of Min. Rat. Bergbohm	15th & 16th copy
Operational Staff G B for the attention of Ministerial Director Sarnow	17th & 18th copies
Reich Minister of Economies for the attention of Ob. Reg. Rat. Dr. Burandt	19th copy
Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Dietrich	20th copy

H1119-0095

H1119-0096

ITEM 41

Reich Labour Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder	21st copy
Directorate of the Reichsbank for the attention of the Reichsbank dir. Dr. Müller	22nd copy
Reich Conservator of Forests for the attention of Oberlandforstmeister Hausmann	23rd copy
Reich Office for long range regional planning (Raunoreburg) for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Schepers	24th copy
President of the Secret Cabinet Council Reich Minister Freiherr von Neurath	25th copy
Reich Minister Frank for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. Buhler	26th copy
Head of Reich Labour Service for the attention of Oberarbeitsfuhrer Richter	27th copy
OKH (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (80X)	28th - 107th copy
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force (2nd Div. Air Force General Staff) (30X)	108th - 137th copy
OKM (A II) (15 x)	138th - 152nd copy
Adjutant to the Fuhrer	153rd copy
OKW: Chief of OKW	154th copy
WZ	155th copy
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Armed Forces Staff (with NA for WWi, WRo, WRü) (4X)	165th - 168th copy
Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X)	169th - 170th copy
L (Chief, Ia, Ib, Ic, II, IVa, IVb, IVc, IVd, K)	171st - 180th copy
WH	181st copy
WR	182nd copy
Special Staff W	183rd copy
Stock kept at LIV	184th - 200th copy

H1119-0097

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 42 — 200 copies, 153rd copy — Berlin, 30.9.38

(STAMP-)
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor
Rec. 3 Oct 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IVA

Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German area.

Enclosures: Reg.No. 267138
Dispatched -
Clerk

1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.

   For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.

2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 ReichMarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense.

3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

(Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41)

Item 43 is handwritten notes too illegible to translate.

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 44

Berlin, 1st October 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa

150 copies
18th copy

Top Secret

(Stamp-)

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct.3rd 1938, Encl.2-30
Reg.No. 268338 Secret
Dispatched -
Check -

MOST SECRET

SPECIAL ORDERS NO.3 to DIRECTIVE No.1

Parts of the Army Employed.

In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:

Command (Generalkommando) III

10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf Div)

The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army
By direction
Jodl

Distribution: III
and special distribution

Item 45

Army Teleprint Network

	Received from	Pass to	Date	Time	Re.No.	by
Teleprint) Office) Notes)	HDZG 9.10	Dept Kinnisch (?)	9.10			Schm.(?)

by Joe (?)

Delay notes:

Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304 Priority notes:
Tel.No. of Sender:

TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT * FUHRER'S TRAIN * (FUHRERZUG)

1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS..

2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA , FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS.. FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 ....

signed KEITEL

(Ink Notes:-) Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Beyle. Fuhrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.

SCHMUNDT
Lt.Col.

H1119-0098

H1119-0099

Item 46

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

The C-in-C of the Army

Berlin W 35 October 10th, 38

Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel.

11.10.38

1800 hours Schm.

My Fuhrer!

I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service (Grenzaufsichtsdienst) in the next few days.

It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.

I therefore ask you, my Fuhrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me - that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.

Heil my Fuhrer,

VON BRAUCHITSCH

(Handwritten Note:) Submitted to Fuhrer 11 Nov. Agreed.

H1119-0100

Remarks of teleprint office

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Army Telegraph Network

Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
Received from HQZ6 10.10 1930	Schmundt's Dept.	10.10	1940	Schm.

Delay notes

Item 47

Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

Telegram SECRET
HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.

TELEGRAM TO FUHRER'S TRAIN, LT.COL. SCHMUNDT

IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION

PRINCIPLE: 1) To SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.

2) ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.

3) TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.

4) IN THE WEST - GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LINES.

5) INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED

OKW

Item 47

Fuhrer's decision:

1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division

Relayed to Lt. Colonel Leitzler at 2300, 10.11

SCHMUNDT

Lt.Col.
(in Schmundt's writing)

(Next page contains illegible notes)

Item 47

10.10.38
What is in the Zone?

5 1 (motorized)
1 (light)
1 armoured
1 mountain
1 div.

For special duties 1 mountain
3 div
1 truck transport regt.

4 3 motorized div
1 light
1 armoured
2 div
Liebstandarte

3. 4 div
Germania

1 1 armoured
3 div

13 div
4 div (motorized)
3 armoured
2 mountain
2 light

24 divisions

(notes in Schmundt's writing)

H1119-0102

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

Army Telegraph Network

Notes of Telegraph Office	Received	Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
	from HOZG 11.10.10.45	Lt.Col. Schmundt	11.10			Schm.

by Schm.
Note of delay

Item 47

HBZG 008 1040 Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15. AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUHRER HAS BEEN DESPATCHED.

OKH 6th Div. (Five)

General Staff of the German Army

11.37/38

H1119-0103

Item 48

(Ink note)

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.

(Rest of note impossible to decipher completely)

H1119-0104

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Notes of the telegraph office) Army Telegraph Network

Received	Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by	
from HBZC 11.10.1955.	Lt.Col. Schmundt	11.10	2030		Joe	1)4 Mot. Div. 1 B'n ready to march (?) 1 Arm'd Brig.

by Schm.

Notes re delay

24
+5
29 (Uncipherable note)

Note of priority:
Tel. No. of Sender

Item 48 TOP SECRET

HBZG 13 1930.11.10
Lt. Col. Schmundt

Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS: ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP A: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division

B) LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?

Answer: A) Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)

B) Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?

Answer A) Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.

B) Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION - THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE - LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.

H1119-0105

Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 hours

(signed) KEITEL

H1119-0106

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
(Con'd)

Berlin, Oct 12th, 1938

Item 49
LI a

3 copies
1st copy

REFLECTIONS

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area

PRESENT STRENGTH

ARMY GROUP	NO. OF DIVS.	DIV NOS EARMARKED FOR WITHDRAWAL	NO OF DIV TO BE WITHDRAWN	STRENGTH AFTER WITHDRAWAL
Army Group Command 5	5 1/3	1/3 44, 2 Mtn, 3 Mtn, 29th Mot, 4 Light, 2nd Armoured	3	1 1/3 2 1/3
Army Group Command for Special Duties	4 1/3 plus 1 SS Regt)	1/3 5th,7th,9th, 45th, 1st Mtn.	1 1/3	3 1
Army Group Command 4	7 (plus 1 SS Regt)	10th,24th,2nd (Mot), 13th (Mot), 20th (Mot), 1st Light, 1st Arm'd.	2	4 2
Army Group Command 3	3 (plus 1 SS Regt)	4th, 3rd, 18th	2	2 1
Army Group Command	4	8th,28th,30th, 3rd Arm'd.	1	3 2
TOTAL	22 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)		8 1/3	14 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)

Namely:	Namely:	Namely:
11 2/3 Inf Div	3 1/3 Inf Divs	8 2/3 Inf Div
3 Mtn Divs	2 Mtn Divs	1 Mtn Div
3 Mot Divs	1 Mot Div	2 Mot Divs
3 Light Divs	1 Light Div	1 Light Div
3 Armd Divs.	1 Arm'd Div	2 Arm'd Divs

7 1/3

H1119-0107

ITEM 50

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received
on 17.10 from kg
at 1535 by (Indecipherable)
Notes re delay
MBZ 0 61
Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525
Lt. Colonel Schmundt

Space for Receipt Stamp

OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14 1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October - this is necessary for the building up of the Army - and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div., 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div) Fuhrer's decision requested to-day.

Signed Keitel

(Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:)

The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct.

By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel,

Section L, OKW.

Schmundt, Lt. Col.

H1119-0108

ITEM 51

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938

Despatched 19 X 38 M

TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY

GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3½ millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.

(signed) Adolf Hitler

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938

(signed) Schmundt,

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

After Delivery:

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

I request that publication in the press be initiated from there

H1119-0109

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388-PS
Continued

Item 51.

1st Draft

To

The C - in - C of the Army

The occupation of the Sudeten - German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3½ million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.

J.

(Handwritten note)
The military SS (SS VERFÜFUNGSTRUPPE), the SS and SA

- - - -

2nd Draft

(Exact repeat of Item 51 followed by handwritten note)

Signed Adolf Hitler (unknown hand)

ITEM 52

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a

Berlin, Oct. 18th, 1938

1300 hours

(Stamp)
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
attached to the Fuhrer & Reich Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret
Despatch Clerk W

60 copies
Copy

MOST SECRET

Directive No. 4

The Fuehrer has ordered:

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.

2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution: III

H1119-0110

H1119-0111

ITEM 53

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received at 1040 by (Indecipherable) Initials Space for Receipt Stamp
Notes re delay
MBZ 066
Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:

(SECRET) - OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38 Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL

Handwritten: Consent given, 21 Oct 38.

Passed to Colonel Jodl's

Ante-Room at 1400

Sch 22/10

ITEM 54

MOST SECRET

TOP SECRET

Only through officer

Conference Notes

L I a

Berlin, 27.9.38

4 copies
1st copy

Time of Attack "Grun"?
(Z v. A Grun.)

COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i. e. about 0615, it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indespensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force, - desirable as it may be, may possibly have to be dispensed with.

H1119-0112

ITEM 54

Thus it is Proposed:

Attack by the Army - independent of the attack by the air force - at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

(J)

L
79

H1119-0113A

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Geheime Reichssache)

TOP SECRET
To be transmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder

Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Admi. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmidt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

(Page 2)

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematized form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany has dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. (p 3)

H1119-0114

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: (p 4)

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy." Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour. (p 5)

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

H1119-0115

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France, (p 6).

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it.
If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. (p 7) The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure. (p 8)

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

H1119-0116

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power. (p 9)

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following.

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. (p 10). It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the fleet's protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:-

1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned;
2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise;
3. Human failings;
4. Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. (p 11) It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

H1119-0117

1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.
This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

(page 12)

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. (p 13)

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

H1119-0118

This is the plan of attack.

The plan demands:- (page 14)

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-
   e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

   (b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.
   The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighboring states. (Literally: Neighboring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will include representatives of the three services, and, as and when necessary will call upon the services of the three Commanders in Chief or Chiefs of Staff.

This Staff will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

(page 15)

The planning staff is resp nsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decisions taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - 120,000 men in each age class!

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot Line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entirety, is important.

The object:

1. Study of the problem in its entirety.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and skeptical judgment.

H1119-0119

H1119-0120

Working principles:

1. No one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program.
c) The armaments programs are to be postponed to 1943 or 1944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

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18 November 1945

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79

I, Leo Davenport, S/Sgt, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant in the English and German languages and this is a true translation of Document No. L-79.

Leo Davenport
S/Sgt, 32496587

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-3
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF
COUNSEL

Contents of Hitler's Talk to the Supreme Commander and Commanding Generals, Obersalzberg, 22-8-39

Decision to attack Poland in the spring. Originally it was feared that due to political combinations, England, Russia, France and Poland had to be fought against simultaneously. Even this risk would have had to be borne. Goering has stated that the Four Year Plan had failed and that we were at the end if we were not victorious in the coming year.

Since Autumn, 1938, and since, I have found out that Japan does not go with us without conditions, and that Mussolini is menaced by the weak-headed king and the treacherous scoundrel of a Crown Prince. I have decided to go with Stalin. On the whole, there are only three great statesmen in the world: Stalin, myself and Mussolini. Mussolini, the weakest, has not been able to break either the power of the crown or of the church. Stalin and I are the only ones that see only the future. So I shall shake hands with Stalin within a few weeks on the common German-Russian border and undertake with him a new distribution of the world.

Our strength is in our quickness and our brutality. Ghengis Khan had millions of women and children killed by his own will and with a gay heart. History sees only in him a great state builder. What weak Western European civilization thinks about me does not matter. I have given the order and will have every one shot, who utters even one word of criticism that the aim of the war is not to attain certain lines, but consists in the physical destruction of the opponent. Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only my "Death's Head Units" with the order to kill without pity or mercy all men, women and children of Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?

Colonel General (Generaloberst) von BRAUCHITSCH has promised me to bring the war against Poland to a conclusion within a few weeks. If he would have told me that it would take me two years or even one year only, I would not have issued the order to march and would have temporarily entered into an alliance with England instead of Russia. For we cannot conduct a long war. In any case, a new situation has now been created. I have witnessed the miserable worms Daladier and Chamberlain in Munich. They will be too cowardly to attack. They will not go any further than blockade. Against it we have our autarchy and the Russian raw materials. Poland will be depopulated and colonized with Germans. My pact with Poland was only meant to stall for time. And besides, gentlemen, in Russia will happen just what I have practised with Poland. After Stalin's death (he is seriously ill), we shall crush the Soviet Union.

The small countries do not frighten me. After Kemal's death, Turkey will be ruled by morons and half-idiots. Carol of Rumania is a thoroughly corrupted slave of his sexual desires. The King of Belgium and the Northern kings are weak puppets, depending on the good digestion of their over-fed and tired peoples.

We must take into account the defection of Japan. I have left to Japan a whole year's time to decide. The Emperor is the companion piece of the late Czars. Weak, cowardly, irresolute, may he fall before a revolution. My association with Japan was never popular. We will furthermore cause unrest in the Far East and Arabia. Let us think of ourselves as masters and consider these people at best as lacquered half-monkeys, who need to feel the knout.

The occasion is favorable now as it has never been. I have only one fear and that is that Chamberlain or such another dirty swine comes to me with propositions or a change of mind. He will be thrown downstairs. And even if I must personally kick him in the belly before the eyes of all the photographers.

No, for this it is too late. The invasion and the extermination of Poland begins on Saturday morning. I will have a few companies in Polish uniform attack in Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate. Whether the world believes it doesn't mean a damn to me. The world believes only in success.

Glory and honor are beckoning to you, gentlemen, as they never did for centuries. Be hard. Be without mercy. Act quicker and more brutally than the others. The citizens of Western Europe must quiver in horror. That is the most human warfare for it scares them off.

The new warfare corresponds to the new border status. A wall from Reval, Lublin, Kaschau to the Danube Estuary. The Russians get the rest. Ribbentrop has received instructions to make any offer and to accept any demand. In the West, I reserve the right to ascertain the line strategically best. Here, there will be something to do with Holland, Belgium, French Lorraine as protectorate areas.

And now, on to the enemy!... In Warsaw, we will celebrate our meeting again...

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The speech was listened to enthusiastically. Goering jumped on the table. Bloodthirsty thanks and bloody promises. He danced around like a savage. The few (!) doubtful ones remained silent.

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During the meal, Hitler stated that he must operate this year, as he would not be living long. His successor would not be able to do so; furthermore, the situation would be desperate in two years at the latest.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 November 1945

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, Staff Sergeant, 13146954, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-3.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL,
S/Sgt., 13146954.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

The Führer's speech to the Cammanders in Chief on 22 August 1939.

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we will discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essentialspoints have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:

1)First of all two personal constitutions:

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidance of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party of our internal unity.

On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.

For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years, Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.

The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

H1119-0123

France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.

Further favorable factors for us are these:

Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.

Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.

All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland(Danzig corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone toward us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.

Reference to previous risks.

I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question; The Führer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves forpresent the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact. The construction program of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

H1119-0124

The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 million pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.

France lacks men(decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

1)Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.

2) Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Skandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Mr. von Brandutch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in 1914-1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victorious or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-agression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.

The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.

Today's publication of the non-agression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

Goering answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.

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H1119-0125

H1119-0126

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Contd.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS ;

15 Nov 1945.

I, Virginia von Schon, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 798-PS.

Virginia von Schon
046318

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H1119-0126A

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUHRER ON 22 Aug. '39.

It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidences, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but me. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.

Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war,- never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get that is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.

Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.

First aim; advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of atrition.

New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.

Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1014-PS.

12 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIELSEN, 2nd Lt. Inf 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1014-PS.

FRED NIELSEN
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67.

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H1119-0127A

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs.

The Fuehrer's Headquarters
18 December 40

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Directive Nr. 21

Case Barbarossa

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick compaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa)

For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

For the Eastern campaign the Airforce will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.

Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intented beginning of operations

Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.

The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:

I. General Purpose:

The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian Airforce is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.

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II. Probable allies and their tasks.

. . . . . .

(Page 4, Par. II).

2.) It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.

. . . . . .

(Page 8, Par. IV).

IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders in chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are precautionary measures, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result.

V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders in chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.

Signed by Hitler

and initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 446-PS

6 November 1945.

I, ALFRED BREINER, X046349, (CIVILIAN), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 446-PS.

ALFRED BREINER
X046349
(CIVILIAN)

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FS
271.8

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.2718=PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Stab Ia

"Matter for Chief"
2 copies
first copy to files Ia
second copy to General
Schubert

May 2nd, 1941

Memorandum

About the result of to=day discussion with the State Secretaries about Barbarossa.

1.) The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed by Russia in the third year of war.

2.) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things neces=sary for us.

3.) The seizure and transfer of oil seeds all cakes are most important, grain is only secondary. The armed forces will probably consume the fat and meat which are on hand.

4.) Only those branches of industry are allowed to resume work which are engaged in fields of shortages, for instance

the factories manufacturing means of transportation
the factories in the general field of supply (iron)
the textileworks,
only such armament factories in whose fields a shortage exists in Germany
establishment of repair centers for the troops naturally to a large extent.

5.) Special troops, perhaps the Reich Labor=Service or reserve for=mations of the army must be provided in order to guarantee the se=curity in the vast areas between the main roads.
It is necessary to find out the most important areas which must therefore be protected.

initialled v.G.

1o. November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2718=PS.

I, Pfc. ERNST H.COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.2718=PS.

ERNST H.COHN
Pfc.
33925738

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Notes Fueh 20/41

NOTES
regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER
and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister
and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin
on the 4th of April 1941.

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal GASPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as bread-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanes Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so , that no American could land in Europe. She would

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conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanes - American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight, anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstandes than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignity of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, Americ would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could ad-

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(Cont.)

vance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that one the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he becameJapanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However,should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he woul indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

signed: SCHMIDT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1881-PS

4 April 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN
Pfc.